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FEDERAL INCORPORATION AND CONTROL
By Frank B. Kellogg, of the Minnesota Bar.
The Congress has power to provide for federal incorporation
of railways and industrial companies to engage in interstate com-
tnerce, and may also by federal license control companies incor-
porated under the laws of the states and engaged in, or about to
engage in, interstate commerce as a part of their business.
The foregoing propositions are so cognate that they will, to
some extent, be considered together. It will probably not be de-
nied that Congress may provide for the incorporation of com-
panies to engage exclusively in interstate commerce, but it is by
many claimed that it has no power to incorporate a company to en-
gage both in interstate and intrastate commerce, and in any event
it may not regulate the internal affairs of companies incorporated
under the laws of the states although engaged in, or about to en-
gage in, interstate commerce. These propositions lead us to a
somewhat extended examination of the whole field. We believe
it may be stated as a general proposition that where the creation
of a corporation is a proper, useful, necessary or needful means
of executing the powers of government or exercising any 1 of the
specific powers conferred by the federal constitution, such cor-
poration may be created or controlled by the federal government,
although a part of its business may not be necessary to the exer-
cise or carrying out of such powers. I shall first consider this
under the clause of the federal constitution to regulate com-
merce. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is not con-
fined to the control of the act of transporting persons or goods.
It includes the power to employ all means necessary or proper to
make such regulations effective. Pursuant to this power Con-
gress may therefore regulate the instrumentalities engaged in in-
terstate commerce and affecting the same.2
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 14 Wheat., 36, 407.
2 1nterstate Commerce Commission v. Ill. Central R. R., 215 U. S.,
472, 475; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., i; The Daniel Ball, io Wall., 557,
565; Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S., 485; Wabash Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S., 557;
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., i; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S., 597;
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S., 344; Johnson v. South-
ern Pacific Co.,196 U. S., 22; Hale v. Henkel, 2o U. S., 75; Schlemmer v.
B. R. & P. R. Co., 2o5 U. S., i; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S., 463;
Stockton v. Balt. & N. Y. R. Co., 32 Fed., 17; Perkins v. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co., 155 Fed., 454; United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co. (C. C.
A., 8th Cir.), z57 Fed., 321.
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If a given subject affects or is connected with interstate com-
merce, Congress can take hold of and legislate in regard to it
with the same freedom as if there were no state lines. Its power
is complete and dominant. It has the full powers of any national
legislature acting upon subjects within its jurisdiction. These
powers are not less because the subject on which it legislates is
delegated by the Constitution of the United States.
3 In Hale v.
Henkel the court held that a corporation receiving its franchises
from the legislature of a state must exercise its powers in doing
interstate business in subordination to the powers of Congress,
and in this respect the powers of the general government "are
the same as if the corporation had been created by an act of
Congress." I
Again, it has been held that in the exercise of the power to reg-
ulate commerce Congress may deal with all the instrumentalities
by which such commerce is conducted. In Hopkins v. United
States,; the court said of commerce and the commerce clause:
"It comprehends, as it is said, intercourse for the purposes of
trade in any and all its forms, including transportation, purchase,
sale and exchange of commodities between the citizens of differ-
ent states, and the power to regulate it embraces all the instric-
ments by which such commerce may be conducted."
In speaking of the same subject, Mr. Justice Harlan, in the
Northern Securities Case, said: "The power of Congress over
commerce extends to all the instrumentalities of such commerce."
In the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois
Central R. R.,7 it appeared that coal intended for the
t'se of the railway company was received in company
cars at the tipple of the coal mine and transported by
it to various places on its line where it was necessary
for the company's use. The court held that the cars thus used
were instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and that the Com-
mission might control their disposition in the division of cars
among coal mines.
What, therefore, is an instrumentality of commerce? It is not
merely the cars and engines used for transportation, or the road-
bed and tracks on which they run. The corporation by which the
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., i.
4 Hale v. Henkel, 2o U. S., 75.
5 171 U. S., 597.
193 U. S., 344.
215 U. S., 472, 475.
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commerce is conducted, as was decided in the Northern Securities
case, is in itself an instrumentality, and Congress may regulate
all the machinery of such a corporation, whenever it enters into
interstate commerce. True, the cars and engines are the direct
means by which the freight is carried, but the corporation is no
less an instrumentality than the roadbed, the stations, the tele-
graph instruments, and the employees operating trains. Congress
has passed many laws regulating certain of these instrumentali-
ties more or less remote from the immediate carriage of the goods,
such, for instance, as the Employers' Liability Act, establishing
rules of liability as between the railway corporations and its em-
ployees engaged in interstate commerce, which the Supreme
Court has held are subject to regulation. 8
The establishment of the rule of liability between the employee
and the corporation for injuries received by the former is cer-
tainly as remote from interstate commerce as the regulation of the
dealings between the officials and the company or the terms upon
which corporate stock shall be issued.
Another instance of such regulation which may be cited is the
Safety Appliance Act, which was held valid in the case of John-
son v. Southern Pacific Co.,' in which it was decided that the
act applied to dining cars, although at the particular time the car
was not making an interstate journey. It was claimed that the
dining car could not be considered an instrument of interstate
commerce until it was actually engaged in interstate movement
or put in a train for such use, under the rule in Coc v. Errol,"
holding that logs hauled to a river to be transported were sub-
ject to local taxation before the transportation had begun.
Again, it is said that for Congress to create corporations en-
gaged in interstate commerce, with power also to engage in intra-
state commerce, or to regulate state corporations engaged in the
former commerce, might result in conflict with the laws of the
state. The answer to this is that within its sphere the power of
Congress is supreme. We must not lose sight of the difference
between the power of Congress over interstate commerce and the
power of the states over intra-state commerce. While undoubt--
edly each is supreme within its own distinctive jurisdiction, if
regulations conflict to any extent, the action of Congress is con-
sEmployers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S., 494.
9 196 U. S., i.
20 z6o U. S., 57.
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trolling under the Sixth Article of the Constitution, which pro-
vides:
"This constitution and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof, * * * shall be the supreme law
of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding."
In Gibbons v. Ogden," Chief Justice Marshall settled for all
time the supremacy of the federal power over interstate com-
merce. He held that the power was plenary and exclusive of
state control or interference; that when necessary to effectuate the
regulations adopted by Congress, the exercise of the power does
not stop at state lines, nor yield to the power of the state, even
though exercised in the regulation of its purely internal affairs;
that, while conceding to the states exclusive jurisdiction over their
internal affairs-such as municipal control, taxation, the control
of purely internal commerce-yet, whenever state laws or regula-
tions come into conflict with the exercise of the power commit-
ted to Congress, necessary to the control of interstate com-
merce, the state regulations must yield.
1 2
It cannot at this day be disputed that Congress may create
federal corporations for the purpose of carrying out any of the
powers specifically conferred by the Constitution of the United
States."
In the case of Wilson v. Shaw, the court quoted from the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Gray, in the North River Bridge case, as fol-
lows:
"Congress, therefore, may create corporations as appropriate
means of executing the powers of government, as, for instance, a
bank for the purpose of carrying on the fiscal operations of the
United States, or a railroad corporation for the purpose of pro-
moting commerce among the states."
It is not necessary to go into an extended examination of au-
thorities to sustain this position. The incorporation of the na-
tional bank and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States sustaining the same afford a striking parallel and convinc-
1"9 Wheat., I.
12 See also Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1, 18; Leisy v. Hardin, x35
U. S., xoo; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S.,
211-227; United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed., 32I.
13 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 3x6, 407; Osborn v. United States
Bank, 9 Wheat., 859, 867; California v. Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S., 1-39;
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S., 25, 34.
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ing authority for the construction of the commerce power for
which I contend. One needs again to read the opinions of Chief
Justice Marshall in these remarkable cases in order to appreciate
thoroughly how completely they sustain these powers. In the
first case, 14 the Chief Justice, writing the opinion of the court,
held not only that Congress had power to incorporate a national
bank as a proper and necessary means of carrying into execution
thd granted powers under the Constitution, but had complete
control over all its business, whether that business was the execu-
tion of a governmental power or private business, and, therefore,
that the states had no power to tax the property of such banks
without the consent of Congress. It was not claimed that there
was any express power conferred upon Congress to incorporate
a national bank. The power to do that was inferred from the
powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate com-
merce, to declare and conduct war, and to .raise and support
armies and navies. It was held that a bank was a proper, neces-
sary, needful, requisite or essential means of carrying these pow-
ers into execution under the provision of the Constitution author-
izing Congress to make "all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States or in any department or officer thereof." In con-
struing the word "necessary" the Chief Justice said that it meant
"needful, requisite, essential, conducive," to the carrying out of
such powers.'5
This subject came again before the court in the case of Os-
born v. United States Bank,16 at which time the court re-exam-
ined the questions theretofore decided in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, and the reasoning in that cash goes even further to sustain
the position I take. It was contended that the principal business
of the bank was private trade and profit, such as discounting bills
and notes and loaning money, which had no relation whatever to
any function of the federal government; that while Congress
might have power to incorporate a company to execute the govern-
mental powers, it had no power to incorporate a company to do
a business not within any of the granted powers under the Con-
stitution. Speaking of the power of the bank, the Chief Justice
said:
14 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 400.
'5 Pages 412-423 of opinion.
25 Wheat., 859.
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"It is, undoubtedly, capable of transacting private as well a-,
public business. While it is the great instrument by which the
fiscal operations of the government are effected, it is.also trading
with individuals for its own advantage. The appellants endeavor
to distinguish between this trade and its agency for the public,
between its banking operations and those qualities which it pos-
sesses in common with every corporation, such as individuality,
immortality, etc. While they seem to admit the right to preserve
this corporate existence, they deny the right to protect it in ,its
trade and business.
"If there be anything in this distinction, it would tend to show
that so much of the act as incorporates the bank is constitutional,
but so much of it as authorizes its banking operations is unconsti-
futional. Congress can make the inanimate body, and employ the
machine as a depository of, and vehicle for, the conveyance of
the treasure of the nation, if it be capable of being so employed,
but cannot breathe into it the vital spirit which alone can bring
it into useful existence. Let this distinction be considered.
"Why is it that Congress can incorporate or create a bank?
This question was answered in the case of M'Cldloch v,. The
State of Maryland. It is an instrument which is 'necessary and
proper' for carrying on the fiscal operations of government. Can
this instrument, on any rational calculation, effect its object, un-
less it be endowed with that faculty of lending and dealing in
money, which is conferred by its charter? If it can, if it be as
competent to the purposes of government without, as with this
faculty, there will be much difficulty in sustaining that essential
part of the charter. If it cannot, then this faculty is necessary
to the legitimate operations of government, and was constitution-
ally and rightfully engrafted on the institution. It is, in that
view of the subject, the vital part of the corporation; it is its
soul; and the right to preserve it originates in the same principle
with the right to preserve the skeleton or body which it animates.
The distinction between destroying what is denominated the cor-
porate franchise, and destroying its vivifying principle, is precisely
as incapable of being maintained, as a distinction between the
right to sentence a human being to death, and a right to sentence
him to a total privation of sustenance during life. Deprive a bank
of its trade and business, which is its sustenance, and its im-
mortality, if it have that property, will be a very useless attribute."
I do not pretend to quote all of this opinion which bears upon
the question. Without reading the entire opinion, no one can
appreciate how completely the reasoning of the Chief Justice
covers the whole field. It may be said, however, that while the
court held that the bank might not be incorporated simply to do a
private business in no way connected with carrying out powers
specially conferred by the federal constitution, it also said that
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if a part of the business was proper and necessary in carrying into
execution those powers, then Congress might not only incorporate
it, but would have exclusive control of all of its functions and pre-
vent the state from interfering therewith, even to the extent of
levying a tax upon its property. If this is true as to banks, it is
equally true as to other corporations which are convenient means
of carrying out the powers conferred by the federal constitution.
Take, for example, railroads. Congress may incorporate them
either under the provision of the Constitution giving Congress
power to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign
nations, or under the provision of the Constitution granting the
power "to establish postoffices and post roads." It matters not
whether their business may consist largely of carrying persons and
property between the states or exclusively within the borders of
a state. If the corporation is a proper, necessary or needful means
of executing the powers of government or of carrying out the
constitutional powers of Congress, it may be. done. If it was
true in the very beginning of the federal government that a cor-
poration was a proper and necessary means for carrying on the
business or executing the express powers of the federal govern-
ment, all the more is it true at the present time. It is a well
known fact that the assembling of sufficient capital to carry on
many of the great enterprises pertaining to interstate commerce or
the carrying of mails, is more properly and conveniently done
through the instrumentality of a corporation. Especially is this
true as to railroads, but the principle is the same as to any asso-
ciation assembling capital for the purposes of carrying out any of
the express powers conferred by the Constitution. It was stated
in the case of Osborn v. The United States Bank, that to deprive
the bank of its trade and business would make it a useless attribute
of the government. Why? Because no one would invest money
in a bank simply as a government depository, or to enable it to
collect government funds and pay them out. But if it may also
engage in a private business, such as discounting paper, making
collections, loaning money, etc., it becomes therefore a valuable
instrument in carrying out the legitimate operations of the gov-
ernment. This principle is equally true with regard to railroads.
It is not practicable to incorporate a railroad simply to carry the
mails or to do exclusively interstate commerce. The commerce
which is intra-state is so intermingled with interstate commerce
and the doing of the one is so necessary to the other that it is
certainly not practicable to have railways incorporated, one to do
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interstate business exclusively and the other intra-state business.
It may be said, then, that the incorporation of railroads should 
be
relegated exclusively to the states. This means that the 
federal
government should relinquish one of its most valuable incidental
powers. There are many reasons why corporations engaged 
al-
most entirely in the great commerce between the states, 
should
be regulated and controlled by federal authority. It 
has been
decided by the courts that the states are absolutely without 
power
to make and enforce many regulations necessary for the 
proper
conduct of interstate commerce. This is particularly 
true of
trusts and combinations, and it is generally believed 
that one of
the most effective means of controlling these trusts is 
to provide
for federal incorporation.
As decided in the Bank Cases, Congress may create a corpora-
tion with authority not only to carry out the powers 
expressly
conferred by the federal constitution, but also to do a private 
busi-
ness. It is difficult to see why Congress may not incorporate
railroads or industrial corporations to effectuate the provisions 
of
the federal constitution, and incidentally to do intrastate 
com-
merce necessarily connected with, and of the same nature 
as the
interstate commerce. It was said in the Bank Cases 
that it has
never been supposed that Congress could create a corporation
simply to do a private banking business, but that private 
banking
was a necessary adjunct to a profitable enterpise, and 
therefore
was a proper means for carrying out the governmental 
functions.
The same argument may apply to railroads and industrial 
corpora-
tions. The intra-state commerce is proper and necessary 
in order
profitably to carry on interstate commerce. They canndt 
be
separated. It is a matter of congratulation that the 
great Chief
Justice in writing the opinions in these cases saw, with 
prophetic
vision beyond any one of his time, a commerce between 
the states
growing to vast proportions until it should become the 
very life-
blood of a great commercial nation. He saw as to that 
com-
merce in this country one great nation-the products 
of every
state transported and consumed in all parts of the country 
and
flowing in streams to foreign nations. The time was when 
trans-
portation was not such a great factor. The 
principal commerce
of the country was the interchange of products in the 
local mar-
ket. But to-day a transportation charge is a legitimate 
tax upon
all commerce. The farmer, the merchant, and the manufacturer
must pay his tribute to the great transportation lines 
of this
country. It is equally true of industrial corporations. 
Their
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business is now principally interstate. More and more is the wis-
dom of their incorporation by the federal government (certainly
of their control) becoming apparent to the people. Is it possible
that Congress may not use one of its most valuable incidental
powers, the power of incorporation, because the corporate entity
when once established, may wish to do some business which is not
interstate? As well might we say that Congress could only in-
corporate a railroad to carry the mails.
The court said in the Pacific railroad cases that there could be
no doubt that, under the power to regulate commerce among
the several states as well as to provide postal accommodations and
meet military exigencies, Congress had authority to incorporate
railways. There may be reasons why Congress should not extend
this power of incorporation to industrial corporations, but they
are reasons which appeal solely to the legislative body and not to
the courts. The power under the Constitution to create corpora-
tions to engage in commerce other than transportation, is the
same as the power to create corporations to engage in transpor-
tation, and as the Supreme Court has often said, conceding the
power to exist, the means by which Congress executes such power
are solely for the legislative branch of the government."?
As a necessary corollary, it would seem clear that Congress
may, as a condition to permitting a state corporation to engage in
interstate commerce, prescribe limitations upon the manner of
doing its business, the amount of capital it shall have, the manier
of issuing and paying for the same upon its corporate organiza-
tion, and upon the action of its officers in dealing with the com-
pany.
It has been said that if Congress could regulate those matters
which are properly subjects of state legislation in the creation of
corporations, it could authorize the consolidation of purely intra-
state corporations or regulate their domestic affairs and cor-
,porate powers, even though they confined themselves absolutely
to domestic business. There is no foundation for this argument.
There is a wide difference between authorizing purely domestic
corporations to consolidate, and providing as a condition to per-
mitting them to engage in interstate commerce that if they do
so engage in such commerce they shall not consolidate or corn-
1T McCulloch v. Maryland, supra.
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bine or restrain or monopolize interstate commerce, or pay divi-
dends beyond a certain rate, or that the officers thereof shall
not deal with such corporations, or that the corporations shall not
issue fictitious stock or otherwise imperil their financial standing.
These are regulations which Congress may impose as a condi-
tion when state corporations project themselves into the domain
of interstate commerce. Congress may declare that all corporations
organized under the laws of any of the states, as a condition of
engaging in interstate commerce, shall comply with such regula-
tions as it may prescribe respecting the movement of such com-
merce, and in so doing may provide rules for the regulation of the
corporation, for the preservation of its solvency, for the safety
of its employees and passengers, and make such other regulations
as it may deem necessary for the effective control of the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce. The power of Congress in
this respect is plenary, and it may select its own instruments to
engage in such commerce. It cannot be doubted that Congress
may create a corporation to conduct interstate commerce and
regulate all its affairs. Is it possible that it may do this and yet
be impotent to regulate the affairs of corporations created by the
states and engaged, by consent of the national power, in the same
national business? The power to create and regulate national cor-
porations as agencies of interstate commerce is conferred by the
same clause of the Constitution as the power to regulate state cor-
porations engaged in interstate commerce. Each has the same
source, and the congressional power must be the same. Any other
construction would permit the states to nullify the plenary power
of Congress by the creation of corporations. I am not announc-
ing any new doctrine, or advancing one step beyond the construc-
tion of Chief Justice Marshall, when I say that when the state
corporation projects itself across the state line and engages in
interstate commerce, it becomes subject to the same regulations,
with respect to all its affairs directly or indirectly relating to such
business as it would be if created by Congress itself.
"No state can, by merely creating a corporation, or in any other
mode, project its authority into other states and across the conti-
nent, so as to prevent Congress from exerting the power it pos-
sesses under the constitution over interstate and international com-
merce or so as to exempt its corporation engaged in interstate
commerce from obedience to any rule lawfully established by Con-
gress for such commerce." Is
Is Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S., 197, 345.
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But we may go a step further. Under the power to regulate
commerce, Congress has plenary power to inhibit altogether such
commerce as in its opinion is injurious to the Nation,
or to prescribe as a condition the rules under which
it shall be carried on. Were this but a single government and the
power to regulate the commerce of the country vested in Con-
gress, I know of no provision of the Constitution of the United
States that would limit that power to mere regulation of the car-
riage of persons or property and would not permit Congress,
when in its judgment there arose a just cause, to inhibit it alto-
gether29
It may be as necessary in the public interest to inhibit commerce
between the states as with foreign nations. The power of com-
plete regulation, of itself, must include the power of inhibition.
Some power must judge when commerce should be permitted and
the rules by which the same should be governed; but if Congress
may only regulate but not prohibit, its power over commerce is
not plenary, as has often been said by the Supreme Court. I
submit that when Congress is legislating under its admitted power
over interstate commerce, it alone can judge whether a particular
commerce is injurious to the public interest or not, and the remedy
of the people, if any, against the abuse of such power, must be
an election of members of Congress who will obey their will.2 0
In the Lottery Cases the court held that Congress may inhibit
altogether the transportation of lottery tickets. The reasoning of
the court fully sustains the position that Congress under the power
to regulate commerce, may inhibit commerce among the states.
The court cited the exercise of the power to inhibit commerce in
the Sherman Act as an illustration.
In the Anti-Trust Cases (Standard Oil and American Tobacco
Cases, supra), the Circuit Courts held that Congress had power to
prohibit corporations combined for the purpose of restraining
commerce, from engaging in any commerce whatever.
If within its power to regulate commerce Congress may abso-
lutely inhibit such commerce, of course it may prescribe the rules
under which it shall be conducted; but it is not necessary to go to
19 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S., 47; Brown v. Houston, 1i4 U. S.,
622, 630; Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 492; U. S. V. Marigold, 9
How., 56o.
20Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 492; In re Rapier, 143 U. S.,
xio; The Lottery Case, x88 U. S., 354; United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
x73 Fed., 177; United States v. American Tobacco Co., z64 Fed., 7oo.
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the length that Congress has power to absolutely inhibit com-
merce between the states. Within its power of regulation it may
prescribe what corporations may so engage in such commerce.
It may prohibit corporations organized under foreign governments
from engaging therein, or prescribe the reguilations under which
they may so engage. It may equally prohibit state corporations
from so engaging, or as a condition prescribe the regulations un-
der which they may engage. Such conditions-may include the
terms under which the capital stock shall be issued and paid for,
and proper guaranties to insure the solvency of such corpora-
tions, to the end that their securities may be safe investments for
the people, and that they may be able to perform their obligations
as initrnmentalities of commerce. It may regulate their business
so as to prohibit them from monopolizing the commerce of the
country or entering into combinations in restraint of trade. The
means by which Congress shall keep open and free the avenues
of commerce are for it alone to decide so long as they are ap-
propriate and are not prohibited.
If the propositions thus far laid down are correct, then the
states may not exclude a corporation created by Congress to en-
gage in interstate commerce, nor prescribe the terms of its ad-
mission to carry on business.
2'
* In considering this question there are certain fundamental rules
it is well to keep in mind. No one questions the proposition that
corporations not engaged in interstate commerce have no rights
beyond the states in which they are created, and that other states
may impose conditions, arbitrary or otherwise, upon their admis-
sion into such states and their right to transact business therein.
Such cases are the Bank of Augusta v. Earl 2 2 ; Paul v. Vir-
ginia 28 ; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York 24 ; Security Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Pruett,25 and other cases cited in the West-
ern Union and Pullman Cases, supra.
21 Western Union Tel. Co. v, Kansas, 216 U. S., 18; Pullman v. Kan-
5G5, 26 U. S., 56; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 142 U. S., 47.
22 13 Peters, 519.
23 8 Wallace, i68.
24143 U. S., 314.
2 5 2o2 U. S., 246.
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The foregoing rule, however, does not apply to corporations
engaged or intending to engage in interstate commerce. 2'
Another proposition which may be conceded is that the states
may tax the property of a foreign corporation situated within the
state, whether the corporation be engaged in interstate commerce
or not. This may take the form of a tax upon the property having
an actual situs in the state, or upon a proportion of the capital
stock fairly intended to represent the property and business situ-
ated in the state, but it cannot go beyond a fair representation or
equivalent of such property engaged in the business in the state.27
The only limitation upon the right of the state to thus tax the
property of foreign corporations is the i4th Amendment to the
federal constitution prohibiting states from denying to persons
(held to include corporations) the equal protection of the laws, un-
der which provision, the states may not tax the property of a
foreign corporation at a different rate than that of a domestic cor-
poration.
Again, the states may not tax property situated beyond the
slate, and this cannot be done under the guise of a license tax
upon the entire stock of the corporation. 21
I believe the natural conclusion from the foregoing propositions
is, that if Congress may incorporate a company and authorize
it to engage in interstate commerce or carry the mails as a post
road, it cannot be excluded from any state nor admitted only upon
such onerous conditions as would cast a burden upon interstate
commerce. The only question about which there seems to be some
doubt is whether the state may exclude such a corporation from
engaging in any domestic commerce or exercising any powers
other than those strictly limited to carrying out the powers con-
ferred upon Congress by the Constitution. I believe the Western
Union and Pullman Cases to be conclusive upon this point, and
this conclusion is borne out by the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes, who discusses the identical question. We may
even concede, for the purposes of this argument, that Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes is right when applying the principle stated by him, to
corporations formed under the laws of the various states and seek-
ing to do business in another state than that of their organization.
26 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas; Pullman v. Kansas, supra, and
authorities therein cited.
27Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v,. Adams, 155 U. S., 696.
28 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas; Pulman v. Kansas, supra, and
authorities therein cited.
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But this does not meet the proposition I make: that no such
limitations can be imposed upon federal corporations thus seeking
to do business in the various states. The Chief Justice, in Osborn
v. Bank (page 867), said:
"If the trade of the bank be essential to its character as a ma-
chine for the fiscal operations of the government, that trade must
be as exempt from state control as the actual conveyance of the
public money. Indeed. a tax bears upon the whole machine; as
well upon the faculty of collecting and transmitting the moneys of
the nation, as on that of discounting the notes of individuals. No
distinction is taken between them."
It seems to me that this is conclusive of the question. The
business of carrying persons and property within the state, inter-
mingled with interstate commerce, is as necessary. for the public
convenience and the trade of the nation as well as the prosperity
of the corporation, as for a bank to engage in the private ousi-
ness of discounting paper. It is as necessary that railways en-
gaged in carrying the mails should also engage in other commerce
as it is that banks should engage in business other than as fiscal
agents of the government. If Congress may incorporate a com-
pany proper and necessary to carry out the express powers con-
ferred by the federal constitution, which company may incidentally
do some business or perform acts not absolutely necessary to the
exercise of such power, but hecessary to its successful operation
as a company, then Congress may certainly protect that company
and its business in or among the various states. I believe, there-
fore, that when Congress under its power to regulate commerce,
which includes all of the instrumentalities of such commerce, de-
cides that a corporation is a reasonable, proper and convenient
instrumentality for carrying out its acknowledged powers, it may
permit such corporation to engage in business in the various states,
although part of that business may not be interstate commerce
nor directly pertain to the exercise of governmental powers.
Frank B. Kellogg.
St. Paul, November 14, I91O.
